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should be indulged which it is legally possible to invoke. '6 4 Witness also
the language of the court in State ex rel. Phelan v. Walsh.65 "It is nore
charitable to suppose that the moderators have made a mistake than that
the voters have done some act by which they have incurred the penalty of
temporary disenfranchisement. We think the presumption in favor of the
voter must prevail."
066
V.
CONCLUSION
The real question presented by Uniform Rule i5 is not whether it
expresses a rule preferable to the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine, but whether
the judicial control which it permits is a desirable thing. If not, then the
inflexible Thayer-Wigmore approach should be followed. Where presump-
tions conflict, a judge will not then be able to choose the one which in his
opinion protects the greater interest but will be compelled to relinquish
the entire decision to the jury. If some degree of judicial control is desir-
able then a system of classification of presumptions, like the one proposed
by Professor Morgan, is the answer. In this way, presumptions may still
be "balanced" but only within certain boundaries and according to a de-
finable standard. If a more liberal judicial control is to be permitted, and
it is submitted that it should be, then the Uniform Rule 15 approach is
the answer. Courts should be able to bring to bear on the determination
of a case their knowledge of the law, their experience and most importantly
their ability, not shared by the jury, to view an individual case ,in its legal
context and to exert some guiding force toward reaching a fair and
reasonable result.
Edward C. Mengel, Jr.
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER SHERBERT V.
VERNER: THE COMMON SENSE OF THE MATTER
I.
INTRODUCTION
The religion clauses of the first amendment' impose a dual limitation
on government in order that the right to worship may remain inviolate.
The separate concepts of non-establishment and free exercise intertwine,
when properly construed, to promote and preserve this liberty. Though
64. Wiggins v. Gillette, 93 Ga. 20, 19 S.E. 86 (1893). (Emphasis added.)
65. 62 Conn. 260, 25 Atl. 1 (1892).
66. Id. at 291, 25 Atl. at 4. (Emphasis added.)
1. U.S. CoNsTr. amend I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......
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the "wall of separation" metaphor provides simplicity of expression, it
appears inadequate to express the precise action necessary to assure the
utmost freedom. Mr. Justice Douglas recognized this inadequacy:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it
studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concert or union or dependency, one on the other. That is the
comnon sense of the matter.2 (Emphasis added.)
Bearing these considerations in mind, this comment proceeds to
examine the demands of the free exercise clause and the impact of the
correlative limitation of the -establishment clause. Specifically, attention will
be directed toward situations wherein active intervention is required to
promote free exercise and the reconciliation of such intervention with the
prohibitions of the establishment clause.
3
Sherbert v. Verner4 confronted the Court with a situation ideally
adapted for a consideration of the interrelationship of the clauses. The
accommodation principles enunciated therein appear to clarify the import
of the religious mandates. The extent and application of these principles
remain a problem, which it is the purpose of this comment to explore.
II.
THE ACcOMMODATION THEORY EXAMINED
A. A n Analysis of Sherbert
In Sherbert, appellant was denied unemployment compensation since
she was not deemed "available for work," as required by the South Caro-
lina statute,5 by reason of her refusal to accept employment which re-
quired Saturday work. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
denial of compensation 6 in spite of appellant's contention that her refusal
to accept employment was justified because it was motivated by her con-
scientious religious beliefs as a member of the Seventh Day Adventist
faith. The United States Supreme Court, reversing on appeal, held that
the denial of benefits abridged the free practice of her religion in violation
of her Constitutional rights. In the absence of a compelling state interest
to the contrary, the Court stated, the exemption must be granted to
accommodate appellant's religious beliefs.
There evolves from this decision a two-fold test which must be met
in order to sustain any law which imposes a burden on the free exercise of
2. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
3. Commentators have posed diverse theories for the proper reading of the religion
clauses. Compare Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv.
426 (1953) with Kurland, Of Church and State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1 (1961). See also Fernandez, The Free Exercise Of Religion, 36 So. CAL.
L. REv. 546 (1963).
4. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5. So. CAR. CODZ tit. 68, §§ 68-113, 68-114 (1962).
6. 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
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religion. Such burden must be removed unless (1) there is a compelling
state interest to the contrary7 and (2) the state interest will, in fact, be
seriously impaired by granting the exemption. The Court ruled out specu-
lation and conjecture as to possible harms resulting from such exemption
as a valid claim of state interest.
8
B. The Personal Interest
The Court in Sherbert first noted that we are dealing with actions
which clearly may be subject to some incidental legislative controls although
abstract beliefs must remain free.9 This dichotomy has long been recognized
and it now appears well established that in certain instances a burden on
religious practices may be permissible. The nature of the burden and the
circumstances requiring it must be examined in order to determine its
justification.
Since, as with many constitutional problems, the question is one of
degree, 10 it becomes essential to characterize the burden on free exercise
as either direct or indirect. The distinction appears simple, in the abstract,
when we describe as direct any legislation which proscribes the practice
itself1 and as indirect, any legislation which neither forbids nor directly
penalizes the practice, but in effect renders it more difficult.12 In applica-
tion to a particular situation, however, the distinction becomes less clear
and the courts find themselves struggling for the proper classification. This
problem presented itself fully in the Sherbert case. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the majority, characterized the burden as direct. Granting
that unemployment compensation has achieved the status of a right, he
concluded that since appellant could not both comply with the statutory
eligibility requirements and fulfill her religious obligations, the burden
was a direct barrier to the free exercise of her religion. 1" Mr. Justice
Stewart, concurring in the result, reasoned that, since she suffered only
economic detriment and was subject to no penal sanction for her actions,
the burden was indirect. 14 Consequently, he concluded that the decision
7. Such interest may appear in a wide variety of contexts, such as control of
marital relationships (bigamy), child labor, or generally, anything within the state's
power to control.
8. 374 U.S. at 407, the Court stated:
The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent
claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work
might not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the
scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work. (Emphasis added.)
9. "The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such." 374 U.S. at 402. The action-
belief dichotomy was first proposed in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878), and has been oft reiterated. E.g. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ;
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Cf. Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
10. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1951).
11. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ; Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
12. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961).
13. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
14. Id. at 417-18.
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was inconsistent with the prior Sunday closing law decision of Braunfeld
v. Brown.15
In conjunction with the nature of the burden, consideration must also
be given to the nature of the practice upon which a burden has been placed.
Abridgement of activities collateral to basic religious ceremonies is clearly
more easily justified than abridgement of the ceremonies themselves.'0
C. The State Interest
In considering the state interest in sustaining the legislation, it is
beyond doubt that the fourteenth amendment has rendered the first amend-
ment applicable in toto to the states.17 Consequently, all legislation which
imposes a burden on the free exercise of religion must conform to the
demands of first amendment freedoms. As the Court stated in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. BarnettelS:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose
all the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for
adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger
to interests which the state may lawfully protect. (Emphasis added.)
It has been suggested, not only that the presumption of constitutionality
which is generally accorded legislation disappears when the legislation con-
flicts with one of the first amendment freedoms, but also that such legisla-
tion must be considered to be prima facie invalid.19 In any event, the
state's interest must go beyond a rational basis for the legislation and
demonstrate a need for such legislation in order to prevent abuse to a
compelling public interest and ". . . it would plainly be incumbent upon
the appellees (the state) to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regu-
lation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights."'20 The Sherbert decision makes it clear that mere speculation will
not suffice to support the legislation.
15. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
16. Compare Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (License required for
"parade" on public streets) with People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (Sacra-
mental use of peyote forbidden by narcotics ban.)
17. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492
(1961) ; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952) ; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
5 (1947); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
18. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ; Accord Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
526-27 (1951) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310"U.S. 296 (1940) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The
immediacy factor has been generally disregarded in applying the test. Cf. Emerson,
Toward A General Theory Of The First Amendment, 72 YALZ L.J. 877, 908-14 (1963).
19. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 173 (1944) (dissent).
20. Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
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D. The Establishment Problem in Sherbert
The Sherbert decision provides a channel for some interesting ob-
servations concerning the establishment of religion limitation. In the well-
known words of Mr. Justice Black:
The 'establishment of religion' clause ... means at least this: Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.
21
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in the result, thought this "insensitive
and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause"22 must be revised in
order to support the decision of the Court in Sherbert. The majority of the
Court saw the exemption, not as an affirmative act in aid of religion, but
rather as the removal of a barrier to appellant's practice, which barrier
had been affirmatively implaced. It is questionable whether prior establish-
ment decisions are so "insensitive and sterile" as Mr. Justice Stewart
suggests. 23 In any event, the Sherbert decision makes it clear that govern-
ment is obliged to maintain a benevolent neutrality, taking affirmative
steps, where necessary, to remove a barrier to the free exercise of religion.
The distinction is purely one of approach to the problem. The decision
accords with the thesis proposed by Professor Katz to the effect that, the
"... limits of the separation doctrine are to be found by reference to the
constitutional principle of religious liberty, not vice versa.
' 
24
It appears worthy of note that the affirmative steps commanded by the
Sherbert decision will clearly not infringe upon the rights of those with
contrary beliefs. Such considerations seem to be of primary importance in
determining the propriety of the exemption.
25
III.
SUBSEQUENT APPLICATIONS OF Sherbert
A. Peyotism Vindicated
In People v. Woody, 26 the Supreme Court of California reversed de-
fendants' convictions for the illegal possession of peyote, a hallucinogen.
2
1
21. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
22. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963).
23. See Note, Free Exercise And Establishment Clauses - Conflict Or Coordina-
tion, 48 MINN. L. Rtv. 929 (1964).
24. Katz, Freedom Of Religion And State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 426,
428 (1953).
25. Mr. Justice White joined Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent from Sherbert. They
proposed that the exemption could be granted by the individual states, if they so
desired, but was not compelled by the Constitution. By strict logic, their analysis is
vulnerable under the establishment clause, since the state would be conferring a
benefit upon Sabbitarians, not removing a barrier to their established rights under
the free exercise clause. However, it is submitted, that such action is compatible
with the first amendment because it amounts, in fact, to each state legislature evaluat-
ing their own state's interest in the same manner the Court did for states generally.
26. 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
27. Although peyote is a hallucinogen, the court concluded that it was within the
term "narcotics," the possession of which is forbidden by the California narcotics
law. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 11500.
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Since the use of peyote is the very essence, a sine qua non, of the religious
ceremony of the Native American Church, the court held that application
of the statutory prohibition of narcotics to this practice was a violation of
the practitioners' rights of "free exercise of religion."
The Woody decision is an expansion of Sherbert in that the exemp-
tion granted was from compliance with a criminal statute. Such expansion
appears valid since the Sherbert decision intimated, by dicta, that a penal
sanction would clearly be a more severe burden on free practice than mere
economic detriment. The personal burden assumes further weight from
the nature of the practice burdened. The use of peyote was an integral part
of their religious ceremony, similar to bread and wine among the Christian
churches.
Concurrently, however, the state's interest in enforcing a penal sanction
must be recognized as far more compelling than its interest in maintaining
uniformity in unemployment legislation. The State suggested: (1) that
the exemption would produce deleterious effects among the Indian com-
munity in consequence of their continued use of peyote; and (2) that a
great burden would be placed upon the administration of the narcotics law
by reason of the spurious claims of religious practice that could be antici-
pated. The first contention was quickly refuted by factual considerations.
The evidence clearly indicated that no permanent deleterious effects re-
sulted from its use nor is there any more propensity to narcotics addiction
among users than among non-users in the Indian community.28 Refutation
of the second contention came in the form of a direct application of the
Sherbert reasoning that mere speculation of future spurious claims cannot
fulfill the state's burden of showing a necessity for denying the exemption.
Thus the case turned on the second factor of the Sherbert test.
Although narcotics control is certainly a compelling state interest, the drug
here involved, being limited primarily to ceremonial use,29 would not, in
fact, substantially impede the state's interest.30 Though there may be a
question whether the Court intended Sherbert to be expanded to encompass
penal sanctions, the application of the "cause in fact" test appears entirely ap-
propriate and, in light of this, the case seems to have been properly decided.
B. Refusal to Serve on Jury Upheld
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the case of In re Jenison,
31
affirmed the contempt conviction of a woman who refused to serve as a
28. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964). The court also pointed out
that ". . . Indian children never, and Indian teenagers rarely, use peyote." Thus, the
state's fear of the "indoctrination of small children" was unfounded.
29. Id. at 73. The court noted that peyote is also worn about the neck, much as a
Catholic wears a medal, and that prayers are directed to it as an object of worship.
30. Id. at 75. To emphasize the lack of any real effect upon state interests, the
court pointed out that such an exemption had been granted in other states (New
Mexico and Montana) with no undesirable consequences.
31. 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963). Appellant's refusal to serve was based
on a literal interpretation of the biblical passage, "Judge not, so you will not be
judged." Matthew 7:1.
[VOL. 10
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petit juror because of her conscientious religious convictions against judg-
ing others. The court reasoned that the solemn obligation of jury service
and the extreme interest of the state in assuring its citizens the right to
trial by a jury of their peers justified such compulsory participation, ir-
respective of religious objections. The United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration 2 in light
of their decision in Sherbert v. Verner.33 Upon reconsideration, the Minn-
esota court reversed the conviction, holding that the state's interest was
not so compelling as to warrant denial of appellant's first amendment right
of free exercise.3
4
The question in Jenison presented itself, not in terms of what barriers
a legislature may place as incidental obstructions to religious practice, but
rather as to whether actions contrary to religious beliefs may be com-
pelled by legislation. It is submitted that the contempt conviction would
have been a violation of appellant's constitutional rights even in the absence
of the Sherbert decision as precedent. 35 Nevertheless, the Minnesota
court, in applying the Sherbert test, depicted the importance of the latter
portion, the "harm in fact" consideration. The court paid due deference
to the jury system and its exalted position in our legal structure. However,
the inevitable conclusion emerged that the mere possibility of feigned
scruples could not suffice to constitute an interest so compelling as to
justify the contempt conviction. That such artificial beliefs could become
general enough to seriously impair the jury system appears almost ludicrous.
Nevertheless, the court's decree granted the exemption with the express
reservation that it persist ". . . until and unless further experience indicates
that the indiscriminate invoking of the First Amendment poses a serious
threat to the effective functioning of our jury system . . .,,31
The decision presents an interesting elucidation of the test formulated
in the Sherbert case. Its application here was clearly appropriate, but there
may be an important question as to whether the state must show actual
abuse of the privilege to warrant a denial of the exemption, as appears a
necessary inference from this decision. Such a burden could be far too
stringent in other areas.
IV.
PRIOR CASES RECONSIDERED
A. Sunday Closing Laws
In Braunfeld v. Brown37 appellants, Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers,
who were obliged by their faith to close their places of business on Sat-
urday, assailed Pennsylvania's Sunday closing legislation 3s as contravening
32. In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) ; noted in 77 HARV. L. Rev. 550 (1964).
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
35. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
36. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963).
37. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1960 Cum. Supp.).
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their constitutional right of free exercise. Appellant, Braunfeld, asserted
that compulsory Sunday closing would render him unable to continue in
business, thereby resulting in the loss of his capital investment. Such
detriment, however great, was admittedly indirect and the Court sustained
the legislation, even as applied to appellants, because of the state's com-
pelling secular interest8 9 in maintaining one uniform day of rest. The
Court recognized that:
* . . the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices
of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and,
as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their
religious beliefs more expensive.
40
This was the first distinction intimated by the Court in the Sherbert
case. 41 There, the appellant could not comply with the statutory require-
ments for unemployment compensation while fulfilling her religious obli-
gation to refrain from Saturday labor. Here, however, compliance with
both obligations - the religious and the legislative - was possible, at
least in the abstract. It is submitted that such a distinction is extremely
tenuous and defies practical application. Appellant Braunfeld's contention,
which was not rejected by the Court, that he would lose his capital invest-
ment emphasizes that it was factually impossible for him, as a merchant,42
to comply with both requirements. Under such analysis, the burdens on
practice in Sherbert and Braunfeld are plainly comparable in type, and the
economic detriment in the Braunfeld situation is the more severe in degree.43
Consequently, for the Braunfeld situation to withstand the Sherbert
test, the state interest must be the controlling factor. It is clear the state
can show a "rational basis" for such legislation, but whether a "necessity"
for a uniform day of rest exists - one day when all activity in the business
community ceases - remains questionable. 44  With our knowledge of
human capacity and optimum productivity, it seems clear that the state has
a "compelling interest" in demanding that each citizen rest one day in
seven. Such considerations would justify Sunday closing laws, unless
alternative legislation will achieve the result without abridging first amend-
ment rights.
39. The Court dispensed with the establishment problem on the basis of McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), decided the same day. The Court had decided in
those cases that, although the Sunday legislation evolved from religious principles,
its secular purpose was now dominant, and its validity did not depend on its origin.
40. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
41. 374 U.S. at 404.
42. The Court's suggestion (366 U.S. at 606) that appellant could pursue another
occupation in order to avoid the economic detriment appears to beg the issue.
43. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1963). Mr. Justice Stewart
(concurring in the result) points out that appellant Braunfeld was in a position to
lose his entire capital investment while appellant Sherbert's loss would be a maximum
of twenty-two weeks compensation.
44. It is suggested in Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602, that the state's interest lies partly
in promoting social communication among members of the community, and that this
interest would be thwarted by such exemption. Although, admittedly, this serves as
a rational basis for the legislation, it appears extremely doubtful that there could be a
compelling interest in the legislation for that purpose.
[VOL. 10
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The alternative which presents itself 's most feasible is that petitioned
for in Braunfeld - retaining the general Sunday ban while exempting
those whose religious practice demands that they refrain from work on
another day. A number of problems inhere in this solution. Primarily, we
must consider (a) who will receive the exemption and (b) the additional
policing problems resultant from such exemptions. Assuming that the bona
fide nature of the individual's belief could be adequately determined before
granting the exemption,45 the extent of the exemption remains problematic.
For example, should an exemption be granted to a Sabbitarian store owner
whose employees are non-Sabbitarians? Or must all personnel be entitled
to the exemption? The legislative problems here involved are far-reaching
and their resolution would have a direct bearing on the policing of the
program. 46 The Braunfeld decision relied heavily on the inherent problems
of administration as a compelling state interest for denying the exemption
but Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting, recognized that twenty-one
states have, of their own initiative, granted such exemptions statutorily.4 1
It is submitted that the effective operation of these exemption programs,
and their very enactment by state legislatures, casts serious doubt upon the
gravity of the asserted state interest.
In light of the unreality of the first distinction made in Sherbert re-
garding the nature of the burden and these considerations concerning the
state's interest, it is submitted that Braunfeld has been seriously threatened
and should have been overruled by the Court in Sherbert. Should the
question again come before the Court, their position may very well be
reversed.
B. Proselytizing Activities
In light of the Sherbert decision, the proselytizing activities of the
Jehovah's Witnesses also warrant re-evaluation. In Prince v. Massachu-
setts,48 the Court affirmed the conviction of a woman for furnishing her
nine year old ward with magazines, knowing of her intent to sell them in
the street, and for permitting the child to work "contrary to law" in vio-
lation of the state's child-labor laws.4 9 Both parties were members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the magazines were religious publications of that
organization.5" The Court sustained the conviction, renouncing appellant's
contention that the statute violated her constitutional right of free exercise.
45. Cf. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
46. For further discussion of the problems inherent in the exemption remedy, see
generally Mann and Garfinkel, The Sunday Closing Laws Decisions - A Critique,
37 N.D. LAW. 323, 334 (1962).
47. 366 U.S. at 614 n.1.
48. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
49. ANN. LAWS OF MASS., Ch. 149, §§ 80, 81 (1913).
50. The magazines were "Watchtower" and "Consolation." Specified small sums
are generally asked, but the magazines may be had without payment. See Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 420 (1943).
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The Prince case confronted the Court with a dual personal interest
- that of the child to participate in practices commanded by her religion
and that of the guardian to raise the child in accordance with those
beliefs. 1 That the obligation to so "spread the gospel" descends upon the
children, as well as the adult members of the Witnesses is evidenced by
their reliance on the scriptural statement, "[A] little child shall lead
them."'5 2 In light of this obligation, the statute, though undoubtedly enacted
for secular purposes, in effect constitutes a direct proscription of a basic
religious practice. 53 The obligation to proselyte is basic to the Jehovah's
Witnesses' practice and must be assessed with this consideration in mind.
The suggestion that the activity should be considered secular, somewhat
similar to bingo games, lotteries, and such fund-raising activities of other
churches5 4 seems unfounded because of the integral relationship of this
activity to their belief.5"
The state has a strong interest in promoting the health and safety of
its citizens, such interest being compounded when children are involved.
At first blush, the proscription of child labor, which takes the form of
distribution of literature in the streets to an often disinterested and some-
times hostile public, appears warranted by a compelling interest. Yet the
fact that this child was accompanied by a presumably competent guardian
casts some doubt on the necessity for the proscription. Consequently, two
questions arise: (1) can we assume that the children will always be ac-
companied? (2) is a competent guardian sufficient protection for the
child? The answer to the first question is uncertain, but could be provided
for by statute, with little difficulty. The answer to the second is clearly no.
In Prince, the guardian and child were positioned about twenty feet apart
at an intersection. 56 Such accompaniment on a crowded city street can
hardly be called protection in other than a "tongue-in-cheek" manner.
There seems little doubt that, in certain instances, the state may
impose its standards of safety upon a parent or guardian. Here, such
imposition abridges the right of free exercise of religion, but, unless the
"danger in fact" test be so absurdly applied as to demand a showing of
actual harm to, or molestation of, one of these children,5 7 the state's interest
appears sufficiently compelling to warrant the proscription. Accommodation
principles must be kept within reasonable bounds.
51. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parent's right to provide
religious with secular education).
52. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
53. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) :
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitu-
tionally invalid .... (Emphasis added.)
54. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 177-78 (1944). (Separate opinion of
Jackson, J.).
55. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943). "This form of religious
activity occupies the same estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the pulpits."
56. 321 U.S. at 162.
57. Cf. In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963). It is submitted that
the court's implication that "actual abuse" must be shown was certainly not intended
to be so interpreted.
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